Denver Law Review
Volume 23

Issue 10

Article 8

1946

Vol. 23, no. 10: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
23 Dicta (1946).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

f
VOLUME

23

1946

f

The Denver Bar Association
The Colorado Bar Association
1946

Printed in U. S. A.

THE BRADFORD-ROBINSON PRINTING CO.
Denver, Colorado

VOL. XXIII

OCTOBER, 1946

No. 10

48th Annual Meeting
Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs
Thursday, October 17, 1946

10:00 A..-District Judges' Association
County Judges' Association
2:00 P.M.-County Judges' Association
Fridcy October 18. 1946
10:00 A.M.-Water Section
Junior Bar Section
Probate and Trust Section and County Judges' Association
District Attorneys' Association
Board of Governors
12:15 P.M.-Luncheon, Law Club of Denver in charge
2:00 P.M.-General session, auspices Junior Bar Section
8:00 P.M.--Ice Show
9:30 P1.-Dancing
Saturday, October 19, 1946
10:00 A.M.--General session, auspices Committee on Judicial Administration
12:15 P.M.-Luncheon-Hon. Bolitha J. Laws, Chief Justice U.S. District
Court for District of Columbia, speaker
2:00 P.M.--General session-President's address by President Frank L.
Moorhead, and other business
5:30 P.M.-Cocktail Party
7:00 P.M.--Annual Banquet. Hon. Tom C. Clark, Attorney General of
U.S., speaker.
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Colorado Bar Association Will Meet
The 48th annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association will be held
at the Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs, October 18 and 19, 1946. The
principal guest speakers will be the Hon. Tom C. Clark, Attorney General of
the United States, who will address the annual banquet on Saturday evening,
and the Hon. Bolitha J. Laws, Chief Justice of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, who will address the Saturday luncheon.
The general session on Friday afternoon will be under the auspices of the
Junior Bar Section and will be of interest to all members of the bar and
particularly to the younger members. It is expected that, among other things,
the question of integration will be discussed. The second general session will
be held on Saturday morning, under the auspices of the Committee on Judicial
Administration. The third general session on Saturday afternoon will be the
regular business session at which President Moorhead will deliver his president's address and which will include discussions by certain committees and
the election of the officers of the association.
Section meetings will be held on Friday morning. The program of the
Probate and Trust section which will be combined with a meeting of the
County Judges' Association, will include a discussion of the "Model Probate
Code of the American Bar Association," by Hubert D. Henry; a discussion
of giving "Notice Under Section 253 of the Probate Law," by Royal C.
Rubright; "Some Inconsistencies in our Probate Laws and Their Remedy,"
by Howard E. ,Parks; "Simplification of Stock Transfers in Estates," by T.
Raber Taylor; and a discussion of the "Problems of the County Judge in Interpreting our Probate Laws," by Judge Hubert Glover.
Floyd Walpole of Denver, is chairman of the Probate and Trust Section, and Judge A. W. Dulweber, is president of the County Judges' Association. The Water Section will meet under the chairmanship of Malcolm
Lindsey of Denver. The Junior Bar Section will have its annual business
meeting under the chairmanship of Sydney E. Shuteran of Denver.
The Board of Governors will meet. The District Attorneys' Assn., of
which Hatfield Chilson of Loveland is the president, will meet to discuss a
legislative program for 1947.
The District Judges' Association and the County Judges' Association
will meet on Thursday. The County Judges' Association will discuss a 1947
legislative program at that time.
On the lighter side will be the luncheon Friday with the Law Club of
Denver in charge; the Ice Review, and the dancing on Friday evening, and
the cocktail party late Friday afternoon.
Reservations should be made directly with the Broadmoor Hotel. The
usual convention rates will prevail.
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The Layman and the Courtst
By JACK FOSTER *
As a newspaper reporter for a quarter century, I have sat before youor your colleagues on other federal benches--on many a grim and dramatic
occasion.
I have listened with awe, exhilaration and occasional cynicism to the
conclusions you have reached, to the decisions you have rendered.
But it never occurred to me that any one of you would ever be inter,
ested in hearing what I-the story teller for the multitudes, the casual reporter to the masses-would have to say. You rest so securely within the
shadow of the eagle, within the comforting arms of life-time appointments
that I had come to believe, I'm afraid, that your world was yours and mine
was mine, and never the twain could meet.
You are impregnable, I thought, within the rough-hewn castle of federal
law.
I as a newspaperman am a shifting mirror that catches the changing
colors of human life.
And so, with such different purposes in the world, I was frankly puzzled
when Judge Orie Philips invited me to speak before you gentlemen this
morning. I was puzzled because I could not see what I might have to say
would be of any value to you in the technical discussions of law and legal
procedure that are to follow.
And yet the more I thought about it the more I realized that unless
there is some bond between you, the federal judges, and me, the layman,
there is no law-and without law there is no America-and without America
there is, in this moment of history, no possible civilization assuring justice
to the individual.
We are gathered today within a few weeks of the anniversary of the
end of a great war. That war was fought between the forces of those who
believed that the right of the state is unquestional and those who declared

that the state is subservient to the will of the majority.
The latter forces-our dying sons and grieving daughters, our little
people from Tincup, Colo., from Okemah, Okla., from Pecos, N. M.,-won

that war. But will their victory be lasting?
There are many factors involved in the establishment of permanent

world peace.

But none of them is more important than the crystallization of

a strong America, and a strong America is not possible, in my opinion, with-

out a human interpretation of law and a human application of legal procedures.

t An address before a Conference of Judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals at Santa Fe, New Mexico, July 22, 1946.
• Editor of The Rocky Mountain News, Denver.
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I do not pretend to know very much about law. But, like the gentleman who knows what he likes in art, I do know what gives me the ultimate
thrill in the slow unfolding of the democratic processes. That thrill comes
from watching an American jury in action. It comes from the realization
that there, sitting in twelve well-worn chairs, are the baker and mechanic,
the banker and housewife selected to judge the alleged offense of one of
their neighbors against their community and his.
These little folk-these people from our midst-were the true enemies
of Nazism and Facism. For they said, "We the multitude are capable of
judging ourselves and no power of superstate or mouthing dictator can ever
match our quiet strength."
But is the jury system-the bulwark of our Democratic life-functioning
as satisfactorily as it should? Are the members of the jury as conscious as
they should be of the overwhelming importance of their duty? Is the procedure for calling and picking a jury as smooth and efficient as it should be?
To get answers to these questions I talked with a number of gentlemen
in Denver who have served within the last few years on federal juries. And
I would like to tell you what they said.
There was the real estate broker. He is a busy man. He counts every
moment as a precious thing that should not be wasted by sitting around all
morning and perhaps all afternoon doing nothing. He felt that even if he
might be permitted to walk up and down the corridor or to call his office
occasionally, he would not get so restless. He felt that the judge was aloof
to his problems.
There was the eminent businessman. His life is one that moves by the
clock. He feels that there is an enormous amount of preventable waste of
time on jury service. He feels that somebody ought to be able to let him
know when there is the likelihood that a case will come to trial, and not
to call him until that time. He has been -on juries before, and he doesn't
think that the judge gives a tinker's dam about him.
There was the erstwhile electrician. He has served on juries repeatedly
and he likes it. He feels that he is performing an important function, and
he is invariably disappointed when he is dismissed before a jury is impanelled.
But he admits he has plenty of time on his hands, and he feels that a closer
check should be kept on the time of cases coming to trial for the bznefit of
busy men.
And then there was the laboratory assistant. He admits that there are
maddening delays in jury procedure. He admits that overcrowded court
facilities frequently make service distasteful. He admits that judges often
give the impression of being utterly indifferent to the proceedings. And yet
he declares he would be fearful of the possible results if jury selection were
placed on a rapid-fire cafeteria-style basis. He said:
"Yes, I dislike the delay. But still I think the slow, deliberate process
of jury selection leads to the greatest possible justice to the individual."
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I was talking with this gentleman in the company of a distinguished
Denver lawyer. At the beginning of his career this lawyer was serving as
deputy in the district attorney's office. He told a story of the fearful results that can follow over-hasty judicial procedure in capricious courts.
He was prosecuting a man a man who was accused of the rape of his
half-wit niece. Under pressure, the jury was completed sooner than expected. And the prosecution was without witnesses in the courtroom. So
the judge dismissed the case, thereby removing the defendant from jeopardy.
Shortly after this the defendant's brother-father of the niece-shot and
killed the defendant.
Said the lawyer:
"And then it was my job to try this man for murder-all because the
first trial was rushed too hurriedly."
There are those jurors, to be sure, who grow impatient with the slow
development of courtroom procedure. And in my opinion there is no
question about the fact that in instances this procedure can be speeded up
without jeopardizing the goal of justice.
In this connection I fervently regret that I was not able to hear the speech
by your distinguished colleague, Chief Justice Laws of the District of
Columbia. If my own talk had been better prepared and didn't need the
rewriting that frequently comes with re-reading in the cold light of dawn I
should have been able to have been here. Chief Justice Laws has earned
ardent distinction for his work as Chairman of the American Bar Association's subcommittee on Improving the Administration of Justice and I am
confident he touched extensively on the question of jury procedure improvement.
But perhaps he didn't enlarge on the human side of jury service. As a
newspaperman, it is difficult for me ever to separate a problem or institution
of any kind from its human aspect. That's the way we have to tell a storythrough people-if we wish our readers to understand it.
In 25 years as reporter and editor, I have talked with hundreds of jurors.
I have listened to their woes, have heard them express their fears, have
watched the troubled lines of regret cross their faces as the foreman handed
in a verdict of first-degree murder.
Many of them were serving unwillingly. They deplored their loss of
time and money.
Many of them had pleaded fervently to be excused-on real and, in
many cases, fictitious reasons.
Some of them, of course, were the more or less professional jurors who
are interested only in the excitement-and fee-of the particular case they
are hearing.
And yet I have found, from watching hundreds of jurors in action
over the years that, when they actually come down to the job of hearing a
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case, they are conscientious, solemn, deliberate and long-suffering citizens.
They realize fully the seriousness of the assignment as citizens that they
have. Despite the inept and incomplete discussion of the high importance
of jury service on the part of some judges, they seem to know that this is a
great and fundamental privilege of all Americans. And, as a rule, I have
found, they reach a decision that is a tolerant, reasonable, in keeping with
the average thinking of the community.
As laymen, they do not attempt to interpret the law.
They seek only, it seems to me, to offer justice to a fellow member of
the human race who they believe has as much right in the courtroom as
they do. They are not primarily concerned as to whether the prisoner before
them ought to be in jail. If he should be, they find him guilty. If they
think he shouldn't, they acquit. The issue is as simple as that in the mind
of the average juror.
In this connection, I am thinking about a case in federal district court
two years ago that absorbed my interest because of the uniqueness of the
charge. It was a case involving treason. It was a case in which three Japanese-American girls in a relocation camp in southern Colorado were charged
with treason and conspiracy to commit treason.
Ond of the distinguished gentlemen in this audience will remember the
case well. He tried the case. He had difficulty, as all of did, in pronouncing
the last name of the leader of the defendants. And so he resorted to referring to her by her nickname-Toots. It was, I assure you, a rare privilege
to hear a federal district judge from this bench of highest dignity refer to a
defendant as "Toots."
But, at any rate, these Japanese-American girls were accused of having
helped two German prisoners of war escape from a nearby prison camp. It
was clearly obvious to the jury that they were guilty. But it likewise was
obvious that they had helped these men escape out of bitterness, anger and
despair because they had been torn away from their California homes-not
in an effort to hinder our country's war effort.
So the jury found them innocent of treason and guilty of the lesser
charge of conspiracy to commit treason. It was a contradictory verdict, to
be sure, yet one that, in my opinion, was entirely within the thought of a
tolerant and reasonable community. To me this federal jury was carrying
out its responsibility in the highest sense of the word.
It was revealing in a practical way the truth of the phrase in one of the
reports of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, adopted in 1938, which you gentlemen will remember says:
"... trial by jury is the best means within our knowledge of keeping
the administration of justice in tune with the community."
But do the judges on the federal bench maintain, without exception, this
humanness that is an inseparable part of a jury. when it is functioning best.
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By their mannerisms in the courtroom, by their attitudes toward the jury,
the lawyers, the working press, do they carry across the essential idea that
the law, above all, is a human instrument, and they are human prophets of
this law?
Sometimes reluctantly I doubt it. Jurors and lawyers alike have recounted to me examples wherein it seemed to them that federal judges have
acted in an unnecessarily aloof, seemingly "better than thou" manner.
Just before I left Denver on the beautiful flight to Santa Fe I told a
friend that I was to speak before you gentlemen on "The Relation Between
the Federal Courts and the Layman."
He replied caustically: "Is there any?"
He was a newspaperman. He was thinking, I am sure, of a certain
rule that exists in the federal district court in Denver. At least it's annoying to us newspapermen-and I have wailed on occasion to my good
friend, the district judge, about it.
This court is only one of several types of offices and bureaus within a
large federal building. Several years ago, for some reason I do not know, the
federal district judge, now gone after years of faithful service to the highest
tribunal in the heavens, decreed that at least so far as newspaper photographs
were concerned the entire building came within his jurisdiction. No photographs of defendants might be taken anywhere in the building.
This rule has been perpetuated by the distinguished present district judge.
A short time ago the newspaper of which I am editor forgot this rule and
took a photograph in the marshal's office. This was during a recess of the
trial; it was far from the courtroom; the defendant had readily given her
consent. Yet we were threatened with contempt of court by our friend and
otherwise pains-takingly helpful district judge.
Personally I feel that in the event we had been cited for contempt and
had fought the case-as we certainly should have done-we would have
won. I personally believe that such citation for contempt on these grounds
would have been a violation of the constitutional guarantees to a free press.
But that is not the point. The point is there here again, in my humble and
perhaps prejudiced opinion, is an example of a federal judge holding himself unnecessarily far apart from the public and the press, assuming to himself what seems to me to be unnecessarily arbitary powers.
If the taking of this photograph had interfered with the processes of
obtaining justice, then, of course, contempt was involved. But if it hadn'tand, of course, it hadn't-then what reason was there for even the threat of
invoking this rule?
Yet I am, I like to believe, a human being myself, and if I were in the
position of authority that tradition gives a federal judge I am not sure that I
might make some rules of my own. There is, I suppose, by the very nature
of events, a greater aloofness on the part of the federal judge than there
is on the part of the state judge.
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The federal judge sits on the bench for life unless Congress removes him
for some flagrant offense. (And what federal judge could possibly wish to
disappoint Congress after their most commendable act of last Saturday?'
The state judge, of course, sits at the will of the electorate.
With such a setup, if I might use the word, you gentlemen are naturally
not as concerned with the cry of the multidude or the hue of the press as
you might otherwise be if the shadow of November were just ahead of you.
I am not saying that this is not a good thing. The necessity of pleading
with the public for votes every four or six years is a grim and debilitating
ordeal. I don't blame you for the rosy satisfaction that you must take out
of the knowledge that yours is a "til death do us part" marriage.
But when this satisfaction tends to blind you to the human factors
in the courtroom, as it conceivably can, then I think a great deal has been
lost. When this sense of security makes you inconsiderate of the none-toobright defendant-the annoying lawyer objecting with the force of a housefly, the blundering witness-when you brush aside these human irritations
with an arbitrary sweep of the hand, then the law suffers, I believe, immeasureably.
For the law must be human if it is to be a law of justice.
And the
interpreters of that law must be human and reasonable themselves if theyare to serve faithfully the ends of truth.
There are two possible kinds of law. The law of tyranny. And the
law of justice.
If the law becomes high-handed, arbitrary, oppressive, tyrannical, then it
breeds fear, distrust, confused resentment and subversiveness in the hearts of
the people. If, on the contrary, the law with high resolve dedicates itself to
the pursuit of justice-not revenge-to the search for a fair balance of human
truth-not punishment of its own sake-then the law becomes the great and
gleaming hope in a chaotic world to which the people can cling.
I am thinking of a little story of a simple person to illustrate this
fervent faith of mine. This was the prohibition era. An Italian woman had
been brought before a federal district judge for having sold some. wine.
She was a widow, the mother of five children. It was her second offense.
The district attorney, with all the majesty of revenge in his soul demanded that she be given the limit. But the federal judge, after listening
to his high murmurs of indignation, said:
"And so you are through. All right, sir, answer me this? If I should
give this woman a long sentence, who would care for her children? Who
would feed them? Who would clothe them? Who would give them even a
small chance to become constructive citizens in society? No, my dear sir,
my job is not to punish. My job is to render justice."
He gave this woman a meager sentence. And he was right. And the
public, who read the story in our newspaper, believed that he was right. And
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the law, through this simple act of granting justice to a little person, gained
new glory, I think, in the minds of our people.
Since I first accepted this assignment from Judge Phillips to speak before you, I have been thinking more profoundly than ever before about what
it seems to me is--or should be-the essence of law.
And I have been talking to myself, as men will, when they are struggling
to some conclusion. And I have been saying:
"Law is a measuring stick of conduct. It is the rule established by men
of good will to produce the greatest contentment to the greatest number in
a world that otherwise would have no order. But it is not an end unto itself. It is rather an expression of principles that change as history changes,
that shift as the need for mercy and charity increase.
"Brought into existence by the mind of man, the law has all of man's
frailties. Therefore, being strong in one generation and inadequate in another, as the races of men are, it must be subject to perpetually changing
interpretation. But, throughout these changes in interpretation, it must
always have as its indestructible goal the burning resolve that the lowliest of
man can come before it and be judged without prejudice, without malice,
without contempt. The law is-or should be-and must be-the unassailable faith of a free people who voluntarily have accepted these restraints so
that none of their number need go to the grave with the black belief that
life was set against him."
As a matter of fact, I have said to myself, the law should be interpreted
primarily to the ends that justice comes to the poor and lowly, the sick and
forsaken. The great do not need the law. They, by virtue of their wealth,
could be mercy unto themselves, could be judges without need for rules. It
is the lowly above all who need the warm, encircling arm of law-and for
them, and their rights as free born citizens, the law primarily should be concerned.
Fortunately judicial evolution has been in this direction during recent
years-certainly during the last quarter century. Over and over again the
Supreme Court has ruled that human rights are far more important than
property rights, and this point of view has spread through a great part of
the federal judiciary.
The Supreme Court, as spokesman for American justice, time and again
has concurred with the late Justice Brandeis in his eloquent expression of
faith that:
"The door of the court is not barred because the plaintiff has committed
a crime. The confirmed criminal is as much entitled to redress as the most
virtuous fellow citizen; no record of crime, no matter how long, makes one
an outlaw."
Whenever there has been evidence that tortuous third-degree methods
have been employed, the Supreme has on most occasions, as you gentlemen
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know, ruled in behalf of the accused, even though he might by guilty. "The
wrack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand."
This was the view of the late Chief Justice Hughes. And in McNabb vs. the
U. S. you gentlemen will remember that the third degree was called by the
Supreme Court for what it is: "An easy but self-defeating way in which
brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection."
No, says the Supreme Court-the Wisconsin policeman who beat a confession out of a man, the Michigan officer who hung a skeleton in a room to
obtain a confession, the Florida authorities who chained a defendant overnight in a mosquito infested cell and questioned him the next day with the
scalp of a dead woman at his feet-no, these shall not rule the land, declares
our highest tribunal.
Furthermore, in searching for other examples of the defense of human
rights, I was amazed to find that the Supreme Court of the United States
during one war year issued 125 writs of certiori, calling for review of convictions of a relatively small band of people known as Jehovah's witnesses.
These cases sprang, as you gentlemen know, for the most part out of police
courts and involved only small fines. Yet the Supreme Court, which denied
to review matters involving millions of dollars in property, felt that the human rights of the individual must be defended at any cost.
Why am I citing these instances in a speech presumably about the relation between the layman and the courts? I am citing them as an affirmation
of my belief that a human court is the only fortress we've really got in the
everlasting struggle of mankind to maintain, as Justice Brandeis said, "the
right to be let alone." A human court, therefore, is the only true relation
that does exist between the people and the law.
Goodness knows, it is regrettable that personal differences among certain members have shaken the belief of some people in the integrity and
authority of the Supreme Court . Yet leaving all personalities aside, and
looking only at the record, this High Tribunal of ours has established in recent years examples of the application of principles of freedom for the individual for which, in my opinion, we shall be eternally grateful.
As this conversation with you comes to an end, let's look at a recent
case involving that strange and curious cult, the Great I Am. The leader
of the Great I Am came into the Supreme Court with a conviction for having accepted money for allegedly fraudulent revelations. But said Mr. Justice Jackson:
"The wrong of these, as I see it, is not in the money the victims part
with half so much as the mental and spiritual poison they get. But that is
precisely the thing the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor,
for the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we
must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish."
A good deal of rubbish comes into your courts, I am certain, gentle-
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tlemen-much of it in the form of objectionable human beings. I am sure
that most of you wish that it had been cast aside somewhere along the way
before it got to you. And yet sometimes I think that the dignity and human
splendor of the law depend to a great extent on how the court disposes
of its rubbish. For it is through the handling of such cases that the court
has the opprotunity once again to state the human principles on which true
law flourishes-and in the restatement of these principles the judge is
brought closer to the layman, the layman closer to the judge.
And that is as it should be. For the layman and the judge are in reality
the same-they arei free people seeking, by tolerance and humanity and
wisdom, to keep-the law a true guide to fruitful lives during the few years
God has alloted us all.
Gentlemen, I realize I have spoken far longer and with less exactitude
than any newspaperman has a right to do. But do forgive me. For I
never expect to have the opportunity of speaking again out loud before a
distinguished gathering of federal judges-and I wanted to make the most
of it.

Colorado Small Estate Law
By A. A. CLEMENTS

*

There is a difference of opinion among members of the legal profession
as to whether the provisions of section 77, chapter 176, 1935 Colorado
Statutes Annotated, authorizes transfer of real estate of a decedent whose
estate does notexceed $300.00 in value. 1 1 have heard of no instance where
the legality of the transfer of personal property under this section has been
questioned. Some lawyers approve titles to real estate transferred under this
section; others disapprove. This situation creates a confusion which detracts
from the confidence of the public in the opinions of lawyers, and casts a
doubt upon the legality of real estate titles so transferred.
Section 77 reads as follows:
"In all cases where the estate of a decedent, or of a minor,
shall be of the value of $300.00 or less, the court may, upon verified application by a creditor, or person interested in the estate,
authorize the payment, transfer or delivery thereof in the case of
a decedent's estate, unto the surviving spouse, or other heirs, or
the creditors in the discretion of the court, and in the case of a
minor, to the natural guardian of the minor, if such there be,
otherwise to a next friend, appointed by the court, without the
* Judge of the Delta County Court.

Editor's note: Real Estate Title Standard No. 37 of the Denver Bar Association
reads, "Problem: Can Section 77, Chapter 176, C. S. A. 1935, with reference to
estates under $300.00 be used to transfer title to real estate?

Answer: No."
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appointment of an administrator, in the case of the decedent, or,
of a guardian in the case of a minor, or the entry of security.
The docket fee in such cases shall be the sum of $5.00."
(Docket fee reduced to $2.00 by laws of 1945.)
This statute repeals all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith.
The legal significance of the word "estate" as used in this section determines the intention of the legislature as to property authorized to be
transferred.
It is the unanimous holding of authorities that the word "estate" as used
in section 77 means all property, both real and personal, of which a person
dies seized.
I here cite a few of such authorities:
"While in its primary and technical sense the term 'estate'
refers only to an interest in land yet it has acquired a much wider
import and application, being applied to all property of every description as well as realty . .2
In Harrison vs. Lamar, 33 Arkansas, 824, in construing a statute providing for transfer of estates of the value of $300.00 or less, it was held that
the word "estate" meant "the mass of property left by decedent."
"In the American courts the word 'estate' is a word of the
It comprehends species of
greatest and broadest significance.
property, real and personal. 3
I quote from the opinion in the case of Glascock, et ux vs. Gray, et al.,
62 S. E. 434:
We must assume that the legislature used the word
,estate' in its true legal significance; and as such it embraces an
interest in anything that is the subject of property, especially in
lands. Preston defines it to be 'the interest which any one has
in lands, or in any other object of property.
"(2) (Objective idea) The thing itself of which one is the
owner; and species of property, real or personal." 4
The above citations very definitely show that section 77 by its provisions authorizes the transfer of both real and personal property.
The position of some lawyers that this act authorizes transfer of personal
property but not real estate is inconsistent and not well taken.
If it is contended that this act authorizes the transfer of property without due process of law, lack of notice, 5 etc., this objection can be as forcibly
2

21 Corpus Juris, 913; 19 American Jurisprudence, 462.

'2 Redfield 'on Wills c 14, sec. 48; Deering vs. Tucker, 55 Me. 287; Godfred
vs. Humphrey, 29 Am. Dec. 621.
'Andersons Dictionary of Law, page 414 (defining estate).
' Editor's note: In the last two regular sessions of the legislature bills have been
introduced to overcome all known objections to transferring real estate under this
act, but these bills have not gained suffic'ent backing of the lawyers and county
judges to insure their passage.
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urged against the legality of transfer of personal property as of real. An
attack on such transfer of personal property is as likely to occur as an attack
on such transfer of real estate. Personal property, stocks, bonds, etc., of
little value at time of transfer, are equally as likely to later become of great
value as is real estate. The value involved in these transfers being so trivial,
attacks on them are very improbable.
This act is a step in the right direction. It is serving a good purpose,
and lawyers should not by captious rulings based on remote possibilities,
thwart the efforts of the legislature to simplify the procedures and minimize
the cost of transfer of these small estates.
If the blight of socialized law and socialized medicine ever settles upon
the legal and medical professions, it will be because the cost of legal procedure and medical treatment and surgery is beyond the ability to pay of a
great number of our citizens. The members of both of these professions
should recognize this fact and lend all possible assistance to practical methods
of alleviating conditions upon which the demand for a destructive socialized
remedy is based.
. We lawyers should also avoid building with petty objections and trivial
technicalities -a public sentiment in harmony with the suggestion of Shakespeare (Henry VI), "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."

Admitted to a Higher Court
CLARENCE A. BAILEY, prominent Denver lawyer, died at the age of 55 years
of a heart attack. He was a graduate of Denver University School of Law
and attended law school at Columbia University. He received the Distinguished Service Cross for military services in the First World War. He was
one of the founders of the Denver Gyro Club and a Mason.

Calendar
October 7-Denver Bar Association regular monthly meeting 12:15 P. M.,
Chamber of Commerce dining room. John Kirkland Clark, of the New
York City Bar, speaker.
October 18 and 19-Colorado Bar Association, 48th Annual Meeting, Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs.
See announcements on pages 213 and 214 of this issue.
October 28 to November 1-American Bar Association, 69th Annual Meeting, Atlantic City, New Jersey. See American Bar Association Journal
for complete announcement.
November 4-Denver Bar Association regular monthly meeting, 12:15 P. M.,
Chamber of Commerce dining room.
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Freedom and the Law t
By

HON. CHARLES

H.

THOMPSON *

We are gathered here this evening under entirely different circumstances
and conditions in which we found ourselves at a similar meeting a year ago.
We were in a great struggle then for our very existence and the thought
of the awful sacrifices being made was a restraining influence in the enjoyment of the occasion. Since that date we have been successful in a great war
and for this victory we are a grateful people.
We, of course, can never repay for the sacrifices made by the noble sons

of America. They can only be repaid by their own satisfaction that-they
have measured up as fighting men to the glorious record of their forefathers.
This to them, and to their loved ones, will always remain as a sacred memory
of devotion to their country.

If we ask ourselves the question, "Why have we always been victorious
in war?" the answer might be in a few words, "As a freedom-loving people we
have always believed in the principles ofoa free government and of human
liberty."

We have never believed in imperialism, nor have we coveted the territory
of any other nation. This, in my judgment, is a fundamental principle of
our success.
A foundation built on territorial aggrandizement cannot hope to succeed.
A clear and striking example of the fallacy of this foundation in government
is found in the rise and fall of the Japanese empire. Few nations in human
history have moved as far forward in such a short time.
Before our recent conflict with Japan she was heavily indebted to us.
It was American loans that built her industries. It- was American purchases
of raw silk that stabilized her industries and commerce; but this meant little
to Japan when friendship stood in the way of territorial ambitions. Prosperity
could not offset the desire for the territory of helpless neighbors or for
the equality with the United States.
In my judgment, Japan, in her struggle for supremacy, failed to appreciate the importance of a free people.
Freedom which prevails in America, and by the help of divine power
shall always prevail, is a dynamic liberating force. Under our freedom not
only have we been successful in war, but five generations of our people have
leaped through stages of progress to achieve standards that have astonished
the world.
Our form of government, which gives us freedom, has created a light that
tReprinted by permission from the Illinois Bar Journal, December, 1945.

Re-

sponse on behalf of Supreme Court of Illinois at dinner tendered in his honor Novem.
ber 30, 1945, Chicago.

*Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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ever burns brightly as a guide in a world dark with monarchy, imperialism,
communism and a desire for territorial expansion.
Ours has been a development through governmental power with a
minimum of laws and a maximum of individual endeavor with no desire to
profit at the expense of our neighbors. The demand for equal justice
for all has been met by our institutions. Freedom and Americanism are
synonymous.
A problem now confronts this nation as to returning to the people the
rights which they had before the war and in returning to peacetime endeavors,
we should renew our allegiance to our government as it operates without
wartime restrictions.
So long as we continue to operate through three branches of government, the executive, legislative and judicial, each separate in their functions,
we will have a government of the people, and so long as we have a government of the people, our profession, which fits into this scheme of government,
will survive and flourish.
To maintain such government the legal profession must take no little
part in its preservation, for by their example the laymen follow in their
footsteps.
That the legal profession will meet this responsibility in this respect, I
have no doubt. The great trust confided to it, with the power it has to direct public sentiment, taken as a whole, it represents a body that is typically
American, and has contributed to the progress and security of the people
equal to the achievements of any other class or group.
Lawyers are called upon to protect the rights and liberties of our people.
They have in their hands the responsibility of seeing that the personal and
property rights of the people are protected from those who might, through
power or unlawful attempts, seek to destroy the rights of their neighbor for
their own personal gain.
In upholding these things the lawyer is supporting the basis on which
a free government rests. The public has a right to expect more than just
oratory on the part of the lawyer. Sometimes oratory only leads to confusion.
When I was a young man I became a member of the Illinois State Senate.
I recall, on the first day, there was a fiery discussion and debate. I turned
around to the Hon. Richard J. Barr, who is yet a member of the state senate,
and who is one of the oldest state senators in point of service, and inquired of
him if this went on all the time. He answered, "Well, the senate is not as
bad now as it was when I first came many years ago. On my first day I
inquired of a gentleman if he was a member of the senate and he said, "Yes,
but don't tell Mother. She thinks I am tending bar down in Missouri."
I will not, at this time, give you my impression of the Supreme Court
on my first day; however, I soon found there was considerable discussion
there.
The lawyer must be a student of the constitution in carrying out his
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professional duties. In order to emphasize the importance of our basic liberties,
the period from December 8 to 15 has been set aside as "Bill of Rights Week."
It was on December 15, 1791, that the first ten amendments to the Federal
constitution were adopted.
The inclusion of the Bill of Rights was a memorable land mark in the
history of human liberty, frequently referred to as the "soul of the constitution."
The Bill of Rights stands today as a bulwark against tyranny-as a protection of the individual in those liberties for which he has struggled from
time immemorial.
We must admit the constitution has been tilted a bit but it is too big to
be turned over by men who are smaller than those who wrote it.
In my judgment, when it comes to an interpretation of the constitutional
restraints and restrictions, all necessary changes can be made without destroying the smallest stone in that foundation; and while the bar is called upon
to perform its functions within that foundation, there is a greater duty upon
the courts to adhere to its provisions as a guide to the profession in carrying
out their duties.
Of course, we do not have to be as technical as the old gentleman who
resided in the only shack left, in one of the mountainous sections of the west
when a tourist stopped and inquired as to where he could find Silver City,
replied, "Stranger, don't move an inch."
But the bar is entitled, when presenting matters to the Supreme Court,
to have its cases decided within reasonable constitutional restraints and restrictions. The bar has a right, also, to have its cases determined, in my
judgment, under the doctrine of stare decisis, which doctrine has been adhered
to and has received proper development in Illinois.
This doctrine gives assurance to the legal profession to the extent that it
is able, with a reasonable degree of certainty, to explain to clients what will
likely be the legal result from investigation of the facts and can be assured
that such advice will be supported should it be necessary to appeal for redress.
The bar certainly is entitled to a better determination than some language
I saw used in an opinion a number of years ago which read like this:
"But if, after all, it be said with any assurance that we have held to the
contrary of our present decision, it can be said with the same assurance that
we have as often held the other way."
Stare decisis offers the necessary stability in any legal system. Blackstone
gave as the reason for the rule of precedents the desire "to keep the scale of
justice even and steady and not liable to waiver with every new Judge's
opinion."
We feel that the Supreme Court of Illinois is a constitutional court, and
that it is a court adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis and that the lawyers
of the State of Illinois may be reassured in their advice to their clients in this
respect.
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The Client Looks at the Lawyer t
By L. H.

HANSEL *

I have been asked to make a few suggestions, as the result of personal
experience or observation, which might not normally be subject to discussion
between attorney and client, and might be helpful to the profession.
The first point that occurs to me from the client's point of view is the
difficulty of arriving at an intelligent choice of his attorney. As far as I
know at the present time, one can depend only upon personal acquaintance
with an attorney or casual advice from friend or business associates. There
seems to be no method, within reach of the public at least, by which the client
can look over -the field of attorneys and get an unbiased background of the
attorney that he is considering.
In other words, there is no way for a client to get the type of information such as is possible on a concern through the offices of a firm like Dun
and Bradstreet.
It occurs to me that an individual may graduate from a law school, hang
up his shingle, and, unless he admits that he is just out of law school, let
one entering his office think that he had a number of years of epxerience in
his profession. On the other hand, certain attorneys have made a specialty
of various branches of law and for particular cases such information publicly
accepted would be of value to the prospective client.
In short, the client, in my opinion, has to take the attorney absolutely
on faith and only by his individual experience resulting from that connection
can he form an opinion as to value. No opportunity is available for making
an intelligent selection, and some means should be provided for that purpose.
When I mention the position of a young attorney, I do not mean to set
the young man in a spotlight position which would detract from his ability
to make a living; but, frankly, I can visualize the sort of report that R. G.
Dun makes on a business organization where it outlines the history of the
members of the organization, gives an idea of the financial stability, of the
specialty that the organization is qualified to handle, and an idea of the experience that that organization may have had.
The second point which is uppermost in my mind is how the average
man feels on the witness stand. Here is a broad subject on which I would
like to confine my remarks to those court actions which do not involve
criminal matters. I refer to actions such as bills in equity, actions at law, and
similar proceedings.
't Reprinted by permission from The Bar Bulletin of the Bar Association of the
City of Boston, March, 1946.
* President, The Felters Company, Boston, Mass., holder of Army-Navy "E'"
with star.
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I have been a witness in such proceedings and have also had opportunity
to watch others and I believe may, to some extent, express that of others.
I see no reason, where no crime is involved, why the witness should be
(1) intimidated (2) embarrassed (3) made to feel that any slip of the
tongue is practically an admission of guilt or a tremendous asset to the opposing side.
I suppose the attorneys figure a great deal of assistance can be obtained
by a thorough knowledge of psychology and due to the fact that the attorney is entirely familiar with his own rights and privileges before the
court, and the witness is simply a hapless victim and does not know his
own rights and privileges, such a witness is naturally under a psychological
tension which in my opinion is entirely unnecessary and can often muddle
rather than clarify the testimony that is supposed to be given.
It is my understanding that a witness is called for the useful purpose
of clarifying an issue. Though it takes a great many people to make up the
world, in my estimation, the majority are simply trying to tell their story
as honestly and as straightforwardly as they can, and the interjections by
the attorney of unreasonable, unfair, sarcastic and even insulting questions
6r remarks seem entirely unnecessary.
I have had the doubtful pleasure of watching an attorney as a witness
and it seemed to me that the best education an attorney could have is to be
a witness and subjected to some of the problems that an ordinary man faces.
The third point is the old subject of the value in money of an attorney's
services. There is not and never will be any formula that can really estimate fairly that figure. It does, however, occur to me that the issue is
somewhat confused by the fact that the profession, neither individually
nor collectively, has considered working out an effective compromise.
The compromise that I am suggesting is that prices for routine work
be standardized. I refer to such things as drawing wills, drawing leases,
checking titles, and many others. I believe it would help the profession if,
according to the individual's overhead, the most was known in advance by
the client on such routine matters, providing exceptional contingencies do
not develop. The cost of that transaction in one office would be a certain
amount and, for the same in another, a different amount, but whatever
it is, it could be and should be given to the client in advance.
I don't believe the trouble on charges in the legal profession is any different than in the medical profession. Both are complicated, but in the
medical profession it seems more easily possible to get some idea of cost
before the operation than it does in the legal.
I have had physicans and surgeons answer me directly where a specific
question was asked that such an such an operation will set me back
$1,000. Immediately my mind tells me whether or not I can afford that
money and if I can't, I have a choice of retiring gracefully with the attempt
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to find another surgeon who can operate for less money, or that same
surgeon will do the $1,000 operation absolutely free if I care to go to the
hospital where he gives his time and skill for charity but, without the personal care before and after the operation.
Briefly, attorneys could be utilized to a larger extent and more freely
if a lot of the minor services had standardized charges and I see no reason
why it isn't possible. *After all, lawyers are in business and must take
business risks, and to a certain extent it is impossible to make a profit on
each single transaction. The first time one has to look up a land title
naturally will be more expensive than the second or the hundredth and
after a little experience, an average cost could be worked out and I think
the attorney should take his chances on all that type of business during the
calendar year as to whether or not he will make an average profit on the
whole and not leave the client mystified, worried as to what it costs him,
afraid to go back for additional discussions or give additional information
because he figures the next call is just adding to his cost, destroying thereby
some of the close cooperation between client and attorney that might be
helpful to both.
One other point for consideration is the question of how technical an
attorney should be in his advice, particularly to business organizations. I
have found that many attorneys give advice that is technically correct simply on the letter of the law, thereby hamstringing the client from making
any moves, sometimes to the detriment of the business when a properly rendered opinion beyond the technicality would and could have relieved the
business, or certain portions at least, and not have closed the door tight.
A good deal of this thought is engendered by the experience of the last
few years with so many government regulations that the average businessman could not afford to have his attorney interpret every one. I believe sincerely that the majority of businesses operating under those many
regulations produced the weapons of war and each one in some small technicality probably laid itself open to question. Where the attorney was
brought into the picture, in many cases, the fear engendered by the resulting
opinion absolutely stopped the organization from proceeding.
Naturally, an attorney cannot render an opinion that is not backed up
by fact or law. But many an interpretation a lawyer makes of an unadjudicated question is only his own opinion, and should be rendered as such.
In other words, if a course of action is clearly proper or improper, a good
lawyer so advises his client. But if the client desires to follow a course which
is not in itself unethical or foolish but may be open to technical legal
objection, his lawyer, instead of closing the door by saying, "You can't do
it," should say: "It's not clear whether you can or not; if you do not find you
were wrong, the possible penalties are so and so;" and let the client decide
whether to assume a business risk.
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As a last point, and probably that is the most difficult upon which to
make a suggestion, I bring up the question of attorneys as executors of
wills and trustees of estates. It is my understanding that the rules and
regulations covering the action of such an individual are pretty well de,
fined by the courts, legislatures and the bar associations themselves, but it
does seem to me that they haven't covered the relationship between the heir
and the executor or trustee.
In my opinion, there is an apparent reluctance in many cases of the attorney to take into his confidence the heirs, even though his actions may
be fully protected by law. Quite often an individual left in the position of
executor for some unknown reason handles himself as though it was his
own private business and will disclose but little except through the periodic
examination forced upon him by law. If that individual would only realize
that it is the heir's money that he is handling and that many of his difficulties would be obviated if the heirs were more closely in touch with the situation, a forward step would be taken.
Interim reports, perhaps personal conferences, would assist materially.
In fact, it could be that the. heir occasionally might have a con3tructive idea
and there is no law which prevents ar executor from adopting it as his own
and operating under it.
Too often, from the time an heir receives the official notice of his inclusion in an estate until some accounting is filed, on the average, no knowledge of the situation as it exists is given, nor is any indication rendered as
to how soon he might be able to enjoy his legacy.
I am not asking the impossible, but the pedestal upon which executors
and trustees sit should be brought down to the level upon which the heir
rests.
In conclusion, I have a deep respect for the legal profession. I believe
that any attorney could make constructive suggestions to business on its
attitude and methods, and I hope some day one of you will.

Newly Admitted Members of the Bar
L. CLANAHAN, admitted Feb. 1946 as result of Dec. 1945 bar exam.
A.B. Univ. of Ill., 1937; Univ. of I11.
and So. Dak. Law School, LL.B. 1939.
Member Alpha Tau Omega and Phi Delta Phi. Practiced law in Carrollton,
Ill. for one year. F.B.I. special agent for 6 years. Associated in general practice with Benj. C. Hilliard, Jr., 515 Midland Savings Building, Denver.
BARKLEY

U. SANDOVAL, admitted Feb. 1946 as result of Dec. 1941 bar exam.
Univ. of Colo. and LL.B. Geo. Washington Univ. 1942; member Phi Sigma
Kappa. Was clerk U. S. Senate; clerk Reconstruction Finance Corporation;
contract examiner and reviewer, Gen!. Acct. Office, Wash. D.C. Served in
army 45 mos. of which 34 mos. was overseas. Retired as 1st lt., SA. Is now
engaged in general practice in Colo. Bldg., Trinidad.
ERNEST
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admitted Dec. 1945 under special soldier rule. B.A. Univ.
of Colo. 1937; LL.B. Westminster Law School 1941.
Member Sigma
Nu Phi. Served in U.S. Army for period 45 mos. of which 17 mos. was in
actual combat in Europe. Had experience in gas and oil business before admission to the bar; is interested in probate and corporation law. Office in
Thatcher Building, Pueblo.
CARL PARLAPIANO,

0. TULLIS, admitted Dec. 1945 under special soldier rule. Univ. of
Neb. 1935-38; LL.B. Univ. of Colo. 1942; member of Chi Phi and Phi Delta
Phi. Served as criminal investigator, army, Jan. 1943-Oct. 1945. Served in
England, France, Brazil from Aug. 1943 to Sept. 1945. Practicularly interested in real property and probate law. Is associated with Edgar L. Dutcher
in the firm of Dutcher and Tullis, First National Bank Bldg., Gunnison,
Colorado.
ERNEST

M. KAL, admitted Feb. 1946 under special soldier rule. Colo.
State Col. of Education, Denver University and LL.B. Westminster Law
School 1940. Member Pi Kappa Delta. In school was active in debate and
oratory. Prior to admission was asst. mgr. clothing mfgr., OPA investigator
and price analyst, army contract termination and surplus property work. Interested in medico-legal work and administrative law. Now located 203 Empire
Building, Denver. Is interested in associating with firm or individual where
can handle own practice and do some work for others.
FREDERICK

admitted Feb. 1946 under special soldier rule. B.A.
Univ. of Colo. 1940; LL.B. Univ. of Colo. 1942; member Pi Kappa Alpha
and Phi Delta Phi. Was on inter-frat. council. Prior to admission was in
the army as instructor, passenger flying A.T.C. overseas. Is particularly
interested in real estate law. Is in the office of C. L. Harrison, 9516 E. Colfax,
Aurora, Colo.
JOHN VINCENT CONDON,

W. HAWLEY, JR., admitted Feb. 19, 1946 under special soldier rule.
A.B. Univ. of Colorado, 1940; LL.B. 1942. Member Delta Tau Delta and
Phi Delta Phi. In school was editor in chief Rocky Mt. Law Rev., and member of Order of the Coif. Was in the army 3 yrs., 2 of which were in Italy.
Made study of Roman law and the modern civil code of Italy. Is interested in
contracts, bankruptcy and real -property. Is Asst. Atty. General of Colo.,
working with the P.U.C.
JOSEPH

W. HAFFKE, admitted Feb. 1946 on motion. Univ. of Omaha LL.B.
1936. Member Lambda Phi. Prior to admission Colo. bar practiced law in
Omaha, Nebraska, and was then enforcement atty, with the fed. gov. Entered
U.S. Navy 1943. Is now in partnership with George A. Doll under the firm
name of Doll & Haffke, 230 Main Street, Ft. Morgan, Colorado.
EARL
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D. HANNEN, admitted Feb. 1946 on motion. Notre Dame Univ.;
A.B. Kans. Univ. 1936; LL.B. Kans Univ. 1938. Member Phi Alpha Delta.
Before admission practiced law in Kans. for 4 years. Served as county atty.
for Coffey County 2 terms. Served 4 years as naval avia. pilot and retired
as It. U.S.N.R. Is interested in real estate and probate law. Is associated
with Chas. J. Munz, 312 Symes Bldg., Denver, Colorado.
JUSTIN

L. JAMES ARTHUR, admitted on motion May 1946. B.S. in Business Admin-

istration, Univ. of Mich. 1935; LL.B. Mich. Univ. 1938. Member Sigma Chi
and Phi Delta Phi. Practiced law in Kans. City, Mo., for 31/2 yrs. Entered
military service in 1942 and upon discharge came to Denver. Interested in
labor law. Associated with F. P. Cranston, 409 Equitable Bldg., Denver.
admitted on motion May 1946. A.B. and LL.B. Univ.
of Alabama, 1934. Member Alpha Tau Omega. Practiced from 1935 to 1942
in Jacksonville, Fla.; in 1942 at the time of entry into the U.S. army was a
member of the firm of Milam, Mcllvaine & Milam, Jacksonville. Served 28
mos. overseas in No. Africa and Italy. Post judge advocate at Buckley Field
until his discharge as lt. col. in Feb. 1946. Interested in probate, trust and
insurance law. Is practicing by himself at 638 Symes Bldg., Denver.
LAWRENCE A. LONG,

Book Review
LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW (1946) by
CHARLES S. RHYNE, published by the National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers, 730 Jackson Place, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.; 583 pages,
Price $10.00.
In this volume the complete experience in this recently developed field
of labor law is compiled. Based on the. judicial, legislative, constitutional,
statutory and practical experience in this field as reflected from a survey of
over 400 American cities, the report embodies a volume of 583 pages and
constitutes an up-to-date edition of a similar report issued by the National
Institute in 1941, entitled, "Power of Municipalities to Enter Into Labor
Union Contracts-A Survey of Law and Experience." City experience is
covered from the Boston police strike in 1919 to the Houston city employes
strike in 1946. In view of the ctirrent membership drive by unions affiliated
with the C. I. 0. and the A. F. of L. in the government field, the volume
is especially timely.
The author first considers the question of the rights of unions of municipal and other public service employes as they exist with respect to their
public agency employer. He then analyzes every known court decision, of
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inferior jurisdiction or otherwise, on the subject, discussing, successively, the
right of municipal employes to organize and join labor unions, instances where
such right can be prohibited or limited (as in the case of police), and the
power of municipalities to contract with labor unions representing municipal
employes. Special attention is devoted to '"exclusive bargaining" privileges,
the "check-off" device, arbitration, the right of municipal employes to strike,
and picketing of public property during labor disputes. There is a discussion
of the exercise of "governmental" as distifiguished from "proprietary" functions as a basis for altering legal relations between municipally-owned utilities
and labor unions of such municipal utility employes. Not only does this book
consider in detail the available judicial decisions, but in the appendix the
complete texts of all court decisions directly involving labor unions and cities
are set forth.
Moving on to. the field of constitutional and statutory law, LABOR
UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW considers the state constitutional provisions of the states of New York, Missouri, Florida and
Arkansas, as these states have each adopted constitutional provisions dealing
with union membership and collective bargaining. Individual statutes of 6
states and statutes of other jurisdictions such as the federal government, the
District of Columbia, Quebec, Canada and Great Britain, are all reviewed.
The full text is included of the recent Virginia statute prohibiting employment by any public agency of the state or any city for one year of any public
employe who engages in a strike.
An important phase of the book deals with the authorities in the nature
of opinions of the attorneys general of 15 states and the city experience and
opinions of the city attorneys of 60 cities. All of the written opinions of city
attorneys are discussed, correlated under a section summarizing the chief
points covered by such opinions, and then set forth in full in the appendix.
Recognizing the extent to which labor has made inroads in certain governmental fields, the report sets forth the policies of various federal agencies
and officers, and the experience -of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Inland Waterways Corporation, the Alaska Railroad, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Opinions of the general counsels of the A. F. of L.
and the C. I. 0. on union membership and union contracts by public employes
are included in full in the appendix, as well as a group of miscellaneous
opinions. In addition, the full texts of the available agreements and contracts
entered into by governmental agencies with labor unions are set forth in the
appendix.
A feature of the appendix which should be particular importance and
interest is the reproduction of lengthy extracts from the brief's prepared in
court cases on behalf of 4 cities involving legal questions under review in this
volume.
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